Accident at Oroville, California
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
INVESTIGATION NO. 3046
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT
OROVILLE YARD, CALIF., ON
DECEMBER 14, 1946
SUMMARY
Railroad: Western Pacific
Date: December 14, 1946
Location: Oroville Yard, Calif.
Kind of accident: Side collision
Equipment involved: Engine and cars : Passenger train
Train number: : 39
Engine numbers: Diesel-electric 556 : 172
Consists: 38 cars : 15 cars
Estimated speeds: Standing : 20 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable and train orders; yard limits
Track: Single; 1º40' curve; 0.17 percent ascending grade westward
Weather: Clear
Time: 2:22 a.m.
Casualties: 15 injured
Cause: Engine fouling main track immediately in front of approaching
train
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION NO. 3046
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE
ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
January 27, 1947
Accident at Qroville Yard, Calif., on December 14, 1946, caused by
an engine fouling the main track immediately in front of an
approaching train.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the
above-entitled-proceeding was referred by the Commission to
Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On December 14, 1946, there was a side collision between an engine
and a passenger train on the Western Pacific Railroad at Oroville
Yard., Calif., which resulted in the injury of 11 passengers, 1
Pullman employee and 3 train-service employees. This accident was
investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Railroad
Commission of California.
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Western Division
extending between Oroville and Stockton, Calif., 111.3 miles, a
single-track line. In the immediate vicinity of the point of
accident trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is
no block system in use. Within yard limits at Oroville Yard, 2.2
miles west of Oroville, a lead track 2,071 feet long, which connects
the west ends of the tracks of a classification yard and the main
track, parallels the main track on the south. The west switch of the
lead track is provided with a No. 10 turnout, and is 3,264 feet west
of the yard office. The accident occurred at the following point of
the main track and the turnout of the west lead-track switch, at a
point 107.5 feet west of the clearance point and 120 feet east of
the west switch. From the east on the main track there is a tangent
2.06 miles in length, which is followed by a compound curve to the
right, the maximum curvature of which is 3º, 1,230 feet to the point
of accident l,599 feet westward. At the point of accident the
curvature is 1º40'. The grade is 0.17 percent ascending westward.
Operating rules read in part as follows:
DEFINITIONS
* * * With Caution -- Restricted Speed -- To run at reduced speed.,
according to conditions, prepared to stop short of a train, engine,
car, misplaced switch, derail, or other obstruction, * * *
5. * * * The time applies to the switch where an inferior train
enters the siding; where there is no siding it applies to the place
from which train order signal is operated; * * *
93. Within yard limits, the main track may be used, protecting
against first-class trains.
Second- and inferior class trains, extra trains and engines must
approach and move with caution within yard limits. * * *
A train-order signal is provided at the yard office at Oroville
Yard.
Description of Accident
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Engine 556, a Diesel-electric yard engine, headed east and pulling
38 cars westward on the lead track, stopped about 2:21 a.m., with
the engine fouling the main track on the turnout of the west
lead-track switch. Immediately afterward engine 556 was struck by
No. 39.
No 39, a west-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of engine
172, one baggage car, three sleeping cars; three coaches, four
sleeping cars, one dining car and, three sleeping cars, in the order
named. All cars were of steel construction. This train departed from
Oroville at 2:15 a.m., on time, passed the yard office at Oroville
Yard, the last open office, at 2:20 a.m. on time, and while moving
at an estimated speed of 20 miles per hour it collided with engine
556.
Engine 556 was derailed to the left, but remained practically
upright and in line with the track. The left side of the engine was
considerably damaged. The first car of the cut of cars being pulled
by engine 556 was derailed. The engine and the first four cars of
No. 39 were derailed. The engine stopped on its right side, north of
the track and at an angle of about 45 degrees to it, with the front
end 189 feet west of the point of accident. The engine was badly
damaged. The tender became separated from the engine and the first
car, and stopped upright at the rear of the engine and at right
angles to the track. The first and second cars stopped upright,
immediately east of the tender and practically at right angles to
the track. The third and fourth cars stopped upright; immediately
east of the second car and in line with the track. The first three
cars were considerably damaged, and the fourth car was slightly
damaged.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 2:22 a.m.
The engineer, the fireman and the baggageman of No. 39 were injured.
Discussion
The rules governing operation on this line provide that within yard
limits the main track may be used, but protection
against-first-class trains must be furnished. The employees
concerned in this investigation so understood.
No. 39, a west-bound first-class train, was due to leave the yard
office at Oroville Yard, the last station where time is shown, 0.62
mile east of the point of accident, at 2:20 a.m. No. 39 passed the
yard office at Oroville at 2:20 a.m., on time. About 2:21 a.m. yard
engine 556, headed eastward but moving westward and pulling a cut of
38 cars from one of the yard tracks to the lead track to switch
these cars to other yard tracks, stopped on the turnout of the west
lead-track switch. Immediately afterward engine 556 was struck by No
39.
As No 39 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the
speed was about 25 miles per hour. The headlight was lighted
brightly, and the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. When
the engine was about 500 feet east of the west lead-track switch the
engineer saw a lighted red fusee in the vicinity of the switch and
engine 556 fouling the main track on the turnout of the switch. He
immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the
train could not be stopped before the collision occurred. The brakes
of this train had been tested and had functioned properly en route.
When the collision occurred the engineer of engine 556 was on the
engine, and the engine foreman and the two switchmen were in the
vicinity of the east end of the cut of cars being pulled by the
engine. Immediately before the accident occurred the fireman
displayed a lighted red fusee and jumped from the engine. The engine
foreman and the switchmen were not aware that their engine had
fouled the main track until after the collision occurred. The
engineer said that it was not his intention to use or to foul the
main track during the movement involved. The air-brakes of the cars
were not coupled to the engine, and the engineer was using only the
brake system of the engine to control the movement. When the engine
was in the vicinity of the clearance point of the turnout of the
west lead-track switch the fireman warned the engineer, then the
engineer moved the independent brake valve to application position.
However, this action was not taken soon enough to control the
movement, and the engineer moved the automatic brake valve to
emergency position. The engine and cars had just been stopped, with
the engine fouling the main track, when the collision occurred.
Engine 556 is equipped with type EL-14 brake equipment, and at the
time the accident occurred the regulating devices were adjusted to
maintain brake-pipe pressure of 80 pounds and main-reservoir
pressure of 130 pounds. Prior to the accident the brakes of the
engine had been tested and had functioned properly.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by an engine fouling the
main track immediately in front of an approaching train.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this twenty-seventh day of January,
1947.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
W. P. BARTEL,
(SEAL) Secretary.